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1.  Introduction 
In 2000, more than 45 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s population was estimated to be 
in poverty (World Bank, 2000).  Over the past decade, substantial research has been focused 
on the relationship between agricultural marketing policy and poverty (see World Bank, 
1994; Barrett and Carter, 1997; Kherallah et al, 2002).  Some countries in Africa have 
undertaken food market “liberalization” measures designed to give the private sector the 
primary role in the distribution of staple food. However, many other countries continue to use 
variable taxes and levies to influence external trade, and have also retained their food 
marketing boards, which continue to directly set prices and influence price levels through 
stockholding policies.  Kenya is an example of the latter group of countries. The Kenya 
National Cereals and Produce Board remains the largest single buyer of maize in the country, 
accounting for roughly 40% of the total marketed maize produced in the country (Jayne et al., 
2005).  To date, there has been little detailed analysis of the effects of specific agricultural 
marketing interventions and policies on poverty, even though discussions to guide the future 
direction for food marketing policy require such analysis. 
This paper examines the effect of Kenya’s maize marketing board operations on the 
level and distribution of poverty.  A recent analysis by Jayne et al, (2005) has estimated that 
the pricing and marketing operations of the National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB) have 
served to raise maize market prices by roughly 20% since the mid 1990s, and thus our 
challenge is to determine how this price change ultimately affects poverty.  Previous studies 
measuring welfare effects of changing food prices (e.g., Deaton, 1989; Budd, 1993; Barrett 
and Dorosh, 1996) considered instantaneous effects on incomes following a change in price, 
and therefore estimates were at the lower bound.  By considering both adjustments in 
production and consumption, and the accompanying responses on the rural wage labor 
market, we extend this model to a second order approximation of equilibrium income   3 
changes. Further, we exploit the parallel between stochastic dominance and commonly used 
measures of poverty (i.e., Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984) to generate poverty rankings 
between the distribution of income with the effects of the NCPB maize policy and the 
distribution of counterfactual incomes. This approach effectively addresses usual concerns 
regarding the sensitivity of poverty estimates to the type of poverty measure used.  
 
2.  Data 
The analysis uses household survey panel data on a nationwide sample of 1,397 small 
farm households in 24 districts collected by the Tegemeo Institute of Egerton University 
during the years 2000 and 2004.  The sample size for the 2000 survey was 1,512 households 
out of which 1,397 participated in the repeated survey of 2004. Preliminary findings on 
attrited households suggest that they are mostly young and poor families with relatively low 
levels of asset endowments. Table 1 gives the geographical composition of the sample used 
in the analysis and the distribution of maize buyers and sellers in each region. 
 
3.  Methods 
Second Order Approximation of Changes in Income 
In Deaton (1989), the indirect utility function of a household is given as 
( ) p b wT V , p y + + = .                                                                                                   (1)  
where, V  is utility value of household i,  w is the wage rate, T  is the total time worked, b  is 
rental income or transfers,  p is price vector, and p  is the household’s profits from farming 
or other family business. Households are assumed to be profit maximizers. Therefore, p  is 
the value of the profit function p  ( p, u,w); where, u is a vector of input prices and w is 
wage rate. Without attempting to speculate about functional form and assuming short run   4 
profit maximization decisions on rental income and wage employment, the general 
representation of the indirect utility function can be given by 
( ) [ ] c p p w u p V , , , p .                                                                                                              (2)  
Where  p p  and  c p  are vectors of producer prices and consumer prices respectively. Further, 
the price of maize ( m p ) can be separated from the vector of other prices to give, 
( ) [ ] c m p m p p w u p p V , , , , , p .                                                                                                 (3)  
To study the effects of a change in the price of maize on a household’s level of living 
(utility) we begin by totally differentiating Equation (3) holding all variables other than the 
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From Hotelling’s lemma 
m
m
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Where  m o  is the profit maximizing maize output.  Roy’s identity implies that 
p ¶
¶ - = ¶




.                                                                                                        (6)  
In Equation (6),  m c  is the utility maximizing quantity of maize consumed. Substituting 
Equation (5) and Equation (6) into Equation (4) and re-arranging terms we get 
( ) m m m dp c o V dV - ¶
¶ = p      .                                                                                           (7)  
The first component of Equation (7)  p ¶
¶V  is the marginal utility of income or profit. The 
second component ( ) m m m dp c o -  is the change in net income resulting from the change in the 
price of maize, which can be computed from the household survey data. To estimate the 
marginal utility of income, one would require an explicit model of the supply and demand 
systems. However, limitations in data availability render such estimation infeasible. We   5 
assume that the marginal utility of income is constant across all households
3. With this 
assumption  p ¶
¶V  is a common scaling factor that can be standardized at a value of 1, which 
is equivalent to assuming that changes in incomes are fully transformed into utility changes in 
a one-to-one correspondence for all households. Therefore, we can write 
( ) i m mi mi i dy dp c o dV = - =                                                                                                    (8)  
When divided by income before the price change, Equation (8) becomes 
( ) m mi mi
o
i i p d l q y dy ln - = .                                                                                                 (9)   




m mi y o p q · =  is the value of maize production (gross maize revenue) for 




m mi y c p l · =  is the budget share 
of maize. Equation (9) can be re-arranged to give 
 ( )
( ) ( ) mi mi
m
o
i i l q
p d
y dy - =
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.                                                                                          (10)  
Since ( ) i
o
i i y d y dy ln = , Equation (10) becomes 




y d - =
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ln .                                                                                               (11)  
Equation (11) can readily be interpreted as the maize price elasticity of income. The 
elasticity captures the very short run (instantaneous) changes in incomes as a result of the 
policy, and is akin to the ‘net benefit ratio’ (NBR) or ‘net consumption ratio’ that is used to 
study the impact of food price changes on income distribution in Deaton (1989), Budd 
(1993), and Barret and Dorosh (1996). This framework can be extended by considering both 
the supply and demand responses as suggested in (Minot and Goletti 2001). However, the 
framework in (Minot and Goletti 2001) is not complete because it ignores the demand side 
                                                   
3 This is equivalent to one of the fundamental assumptions in demand analysis; that aggregate demand is a 
function of prices and aggregate wealth. Both the equal marginal utility of income and the aggregation 
assumption are obtainable when individual preferences admit indirect utility functions of the Gorman form; vi 
(p,wi) = ai(p) + b(p) wi . For further discussions on this topic, see Mas-colell et al (1995) and Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980).   6 
adjustments in labor markets following the supply response and the effects of these on 
incomes of suppliers of rural wage labor. Assuming under-employment of rural labor, the 
short run effects of supply adjustments are not likely to change the wage rate; rather the wage 
bill will change proportionally to the supply elasticity due to changes in man-hours hired.  
Under these postulates, the complete second order approximation of changes (SOAC) in 
income is given by  
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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Where, 
s
mz e  is own price elasticity of maize supply, 
d
mz e  is the own price elasticity of maize 
demand,  mi ws  is the share of income from hired-out farm labor associated with the maize 
enterprise, and  mi wr  are payments to hired labor for maize production as a proportion of 
income. 
The first part of Equation 12 is the percentage change in income evaluated at initial 
share of maize income and initial budget share; the very short run effects.  The second and 
third parts are the remainder term evaluated at some unknown point between the initial values 
and the equilibrium values of maize income share and maize budget share. We assume that at 
that point, there would have been sufficient adjustments such that the maize income share and 
budget share will approximate their initial values, even though production, consumption, and 
income levels would have changed. Therefore, the second derivatives with respect to income 
shares and budget shares are evaluated at their respective initial values, and so are hired labor 
payments to maize and income shares from supplying labor to maize farms.  
The remainder term is an approximation of higher order effects after economy-wide 
adjustments on markets for other commodities and rural farm wages. Such impacts can 
ideally be estimated with the aid of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. 
However, standard CGE models based on household data would involve considerable   7 
aggregation across household types. Chen and Ravallion (2004), contend that they form crude 
tools for welfare distributional analysis, and therefore do not yield results that can be 
considered necessarily superior to those from a second order approximation of the 
equilibrium.  
The very short run (first order) effects are instantaneous income changes that are 
embedded in the income data of households.  Therefore, to generate a second order 
approximation of resultant income changes only the second and third part of Equation (12) is 
applied on income data.  On the same vein, counterfactual incomes are generated by 
subtracting the first part of Equation (12) from the household income data. The policy is 
estimated to have increased the mean of maize prices by 19.7% between 1995 and 2004 
(Jayne et al 2005).  Therefore, for  percent m dp -   in Equation 12, we consider 19.7% and, to 
determine the sensitivity of impacts to the degree of price change, we consider 15% and 25% 
price increases as well.  
 
Stochastic Dominance and Poverty Dominance 
After generating the vector of incomes with the effects of the policy and another 
vector with counterfactual incomes, the next step is to ascertain which of the two income 
distributions has more poverty. Foster and Shorrocks (1988a, 1988b) demonstrate that the 
FGT poverty measures correspond to stochastic dominance partial ordering. If  a P  is the 
measure of poverty, we say  ( ) z F  has more poverty or at least as much poverty as  ( ) z G  if 
( ) z G  dominates  ( ) z F  in the a  degree. For the purposes of this work,  ( ) z F p ; 1  the headcount 
ratio, and  ( ) z F p ; 2  the income gap measure are used, implying that first order  1 D , and 
second order  2 D  stochastic dominance evaluations are respectively considered.    8 
A distribution  ( ) z G  dominates another  ( ) z F  in the first degree if the value of its 
cumulative distribution is less than or equal to that of  ( ) z F  for all  z , and strictly less than 
that of  ( ) z F  in at least one  i z . This would imply that  ( ) z F  has a higher probability for lower 
values compared to  ( ) z G , and therefore the headcount ratio is higher in  F  than in  G  for any 
poverty line in ( ] z , 0 .  Second degree poverty dominance could be used whenever first degree 
dominance cannot be established. This is equivalent to using the poverty gap measure when 
the headcount ratio fails to find more poverty in either distribution.  
A distribution  ( ) z G  dominates another,  ( ) z F  in the second degree when the 
cumulative difference of the area under  ( ) z F  from the area under  ( ) z G  is non-positive; 
formally given as  ( ) ( ) [ ] 0
0 £ - ￿ dy y F y G
z
 for  [ ] z y , 0 X .  ( ) z G  dominates  ( ) z F  in the second 
degree translates to the conclusion that the headcount ratio may be the same in  G  as in  F  
but income shortfalls from any poverty line in ( ] z , 0  are higher in  F   than they are in  G . The 
next section provides results of stochastic (poverty) dominance tests.  The dominance tests 
were generated with the aid of DAD software. 
4.  Results 
Commonly used poverty lines for Kenya include the World Bank $1 a day per person 
poverty line (approximately $30 per month per person) and the Welfare Monitoring Survey 
(WMS) poverty line, which is approximately $16 per month per adult equivalent (GOK 
2000). The wide difference between these poverty thresholds poses a potential source of 
uncertainty when welfare rankings are based on one and not the other – the identification 
problem. To avoid such, first degree poverty orderings are proclaimed only when they hold 
for the World Bank threshold. This is because the World Bank poverty line (approximately 
$30 per month per person) nests the WMS threshold ($16 per month per adult equivalent) and   9 
all other poverty lines less than $30 per person per month. We consider second degree 
dominance tests whenever first degree dominance tests are inconclusive.   
After simulating the effects of the government marketing board (NCPB) operations in 
the maize market that are assumed to have raised local market prices for maize by 19.7%, we 
compute first degree poverty dominance curves for various farming zones (Figures 1 through 
5).  Dominance tests and accompanying curves for 15% and 25% increases in maize prices 
give similar results to the ones for 19.7 % in all the zones. This gives some confidence that 
the results are not sensitive to the degree of price increase brought about by NCPB 
operations, which might in fact vary somewhat geographically across the sample.  
Referring to Figures 1 though 5, the first point at which the two cumulative income 
distributions cross is the upper-bound poverty line for the headcount ratio. For any level of 
income below the crossing point, the value of the cumulative distribution of counterfactual 
incomes is lower than that of incomes with effects of price supports.  Because each of the two 
distributions has a single income observation from every household, the distribution with a 
higher cumulative value has more observations with values less than the crossing point, and 
hence a higher probability for lower incomes. It therefore follows that if we take the crossing 
point or any level of income less than the crossing point to be a poverty line, the headcount 
ratio will be higher with price supports.  
For example, taking the case of the Eastern Lowlands zone (Figure 1 and first row of 
Table 1), the two cumulative distributions cross at US$ 80.43; which is higher than the World 
Bank (US $30) poverty line.  Further, the cumulative value of the distribution of 
counterfactual incomes is below that of incomes with effects of price supports at any value 
less than the crossing point. This means that if any income level below the crossing point is 
taken as a yardstick (e.g. the US $30 World Bank poverty line), the distribution of income   10 
with price supports has a higher probability for lower values compared to counterfactual 
distribution of income with no price supports. A higher probability for lower values translates 
to a higher headcount ratio, as measured in the vertical axis. We conclude that NCPB 
operations in the maize market have increased the number of the poor in Eastern Lowlands. 
Figure 2, 3, 4, and 5 show similar results for Coastal Lowlands, Western Lowlands, Western 
Highlands, and Central Highlands respectively. Corresponding crossing points for Figures 2 
through 5 are also summarized in Table 1. 
In the western transitional zone, the crossing point of first degree stochastic (poverty) 
dominance curves does not nest the World Bank threshold (Figure 6 and sixth row of Table 
1). Therefore poverty orderings in this region will be based on the poverty gap measure, 
which leads us to consider second order dominance test (Figure 7). This test determines the 
cumulative difference of the area under the distribution of incomes with NCPB operations 
from the area under the distribution of counterfactual incomes. The latter dominates the 
former as long as the cumulative differences remain non-positive.  Figure 7 shows that the 
differences are non-positive across the entire range of income. This means that the 
distribution of counterfactual income without price supports dominates in the second degree 
the distribution of income with price supports. Equivalently, we say that if any level of 
income is taken to be a poverty line then income shortfalls from any such poverty line are 
higher with price supports. This leads to the conclusion that in this region the NCPB maize 
operations reduce incomes among those already poor, but do not appreciably affect the 
numbers of the poor. 
Conditions in the western transitional zone with regard to land potential, market 
infrastructure, and crop mix approach those in the high potential maize zone (HPMZ). In 
Kenya, a large proportion of marketed maize is grown in the high potential maize zone. The   11 
region boasts excellent conditions for growing maize and wheat, and farm sizes are relatively 
large. Among the seven agro-climatic zones considered, it is only in this zone where the 
maize price-increasing policy does not increase poverty as measured by the headcount ratio 
and the poverty gap measure. In Figure 8 and last row of Table 1, the crossing point of the 
two cumulative distributions is below both the World Bank poverty line and the WMS 
threshold. Similarly, Figure 9 and Table 2 for second degree dominance test shows that 
cumulative differences in the area under the two distributions remain non-positive only up to 
the 45
th percentile of income, which is equivalent to $27.17 or Kshs 2,120. This threshold is 
lower than the World Bank poverty line and therefore the test is inconclusive. 
   In summary, we find that the effects of the price-increasing policy of the NCPB is 
largely influenced by the proportion of net purchasing and net selling rural households in 
each zone.  As shown in Table 3, the marketed maize output in Kenya is concentrated in one 
zone (High-Potential Maize Zone).  Most other rural areas of Kenya derive the bulk of their 
cash income from other crops, non-farm income, and livestock. 
4.0  Conclusions 
This study estimates the effects on poverty resulting from price changes associated 
with the operations of a maize marketing board in Kenya.  Previous empirical work on 
welfare effects of changing food prices considered instantaneous effects on incomes 
following a change in price, and therefore estimates were at the lower bound.  By considering 
both adjustments in production and consumption, and the accompanying responses on the 
rural wage labor markets, we estimate a second order approximation of equilibrium income 
changes.  We then exploit the parallel between stochastic dominance and commonly used 
measures of poverty to generate poverty rankings between the distribution of income with the 
effects of the government marketing operations and the distribution of counterfactual   12 
incomes. This approach effectively addresses concerns regarding the sensitivity of poverty 
estimates to the type of poverty measure used.  
Results indicate that price supports and tariffs on imported maize exacerbated the 
percentage of households living in poverty in all regions of the country except one - where 
most of the surplus maize originates.  The proportion of the poor is increased in most areas 
where the majority of rural households are buyers of maize. In one zone (Western 
Transitional) the maize price-increasing policy has not raised the number of the poor; 
however, their income shortfalls from the poverty lines are increased.  These results hold for 
differences of up to 40% in supply and demand responses between the highest and lowest 
income quintiles.   
These findings suggest the need for government to consider alternative means to 
promote agricultural growth that do not exacerbate rural poverty in the process.  Reallocating 
budget resources from price supports to cost-reducing / productivity-enhancing investments 
may better provide incentives for surplus-producing farm households to intensify food 
production and raise their incomes while simultaneously benefiting net-purchasing rural 
households and urban consumers through lower food prices.  Public investments that have a 
proven track record in terms of enhancing crop productivity include agricultural crop research 
and development (Oehmke and Crawford, 1996; Alston et al., 2000), investments in physical 
infrastructure to reduce marketing costs (Antle, 1983), and well-structured extension 
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Table 1.   First Order Poverty Dominance of Counterfactual Incomes over Incomes with Effects 
of Price Controls (Headcount ratio higher with Price Controls) 
 
First Crossing Point of  
Cumulative Income Distributions 
 (Upper Bound Poverty Line for Headcount ratio) 
US Dollar ($) amount 
(std deviation) 





15 %  19.7 %  25 %  15 %  19.7 %  25 % 
Robustness to 
the World Bank 
















































































































Table 2.  Second Order Poverty Dominance of Counterfactual Incomes over Incomes with 
Effects of Price Controls (Poverty Gaps Higher with Price Controls) 
 
Amount at which cumulative difference between income 
distributions reaches zero (upper bound poverty line for poverty 
gap measure) 
US Dollar ($) amount 
(std deviation) 





15 %   19.7 %  25 %  15 %  19.7 %  25 % 
Robustness to 
the World Bank 
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Table 3.  Household characteristics with respect to income, landholding size, and maize marketing behavior, 2000 and 2004. 
 









Maize Marketing Position    Household Maize Sales 
7 
        Net Seller  Autarky  Net 
Buyer 
  Net 
Seller 
Autarky  Net 
Buyer 
    -Ksh-  -acres-  -----------  percent ----------    ----------- kgs ------------ 
Western Lowlands
1  170  10920  2.95  5  13  82    315  0  -540 
Eastern Lowlands 
2  150  19355  5.36  23  11  66    564  0  -290 
High-Potential Maize Zone 
3  332  29922  7.73  68  10  22    3022  0  -595 
Western Highlands 
4  180  14055  2.96  23  19  58    580  0  -399 
Western Transitional 
5  150  16578  5.31  23  15  62    1166  0  -694 
Central Highlands 
6  242  28010  2.8  16  21  53    413  0  -316 
Total  1,224  21647  4.81  32  16  52    2028  0  -462 
 
Source: Tegemeo Institute/Egerton University Rural Household Survey, 2000 and 2004 
Districts comprising each zone:  
1 Kisumu and Siaya. 
2 Kitui, Mwingi, Machakos, and Makueni. 
 3 Trans-Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Bomet, Nakuru, and upper elevation divisions 
within Kakamega. 
4 Kisii and Vihiga.  
5 Bungoma and lower elevation divisions of Kakamega. 
6 Muranga, Nyeri, Meru,and Laikipia. 
7 negative Figures indicate quantity of maize and maize meal purchased.  16 
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